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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STEPHANIE C. CECIL,
OPENING BRIEF
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Appellate Court No.: 20030937-CA
JASON ALLEN CECIL,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure because the entry of judgment on October 17, 2003 is considered to
be the final decision of the trial court. Utah Code §78-2a-3(2)(e). The Notice of Appeal
was filed on November 17, 2003. Thus, pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, this appeal is timely.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. The first issue is whether the trial court erred when it imposed the statutory
guidelines for parent-time with the requirement that the noncustodial parent assume all
financial costs associated with parent-time. [R. 82 at 201-206]. The standard of review is
abuse of discretion. Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
B. The second issue is whether the trial court erred when it imputed the noncustodial
parent's income. [R. 82 at 197-200]. The standard of review ic abuce of dioorotion.

Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
C. The third issue is whether the trial court erred when it awarded the custodial parent
alimony. [R. 82 at 209-211]. The standard of review is an abuse of discretion. Rehn v.
Rehn, 974 P2d 306, 312 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
D. The fourth issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in awarding the custodial
parent attorneys' fees. [R. 82 at 209]. The standard of review is an abuse of discretion.
Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431,437 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438,
442 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. CODES AND RULES
Statutes1
Utah Code § 30-3-5
Utah Code § 30-3-32
Utah Code § 30-3-33
Utah Code § 30-3-34
Utah Code § 30-3-37
Utah Code § 78-45-7
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
The nature of the case is a divorce action. [R. 1-2].
B. Course of Proceedings Below
1. On 5/24/02, Stephanie Cecil filed for divorce. [R. 1-2].
2. On 7/11/02, Jason Cecil was served with the Summons and Complaint. [R. 7-8].
'All statutes set forth in this section are set forth in full in the Addendum
2

3. On 8/1/02, Jason Cecil filed his Answer. [R.9-16].
4. On 8/28/03, a bench trial was held. [R. 82].
5. On October 17, 2003, the trial court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and issued its Decree of Divorce. [R. 60-71].
6. On November 17, 2003, Jason Cecil filed a Notice of Appeal. [R. 78-79].
C. Disposition in the Court Below
The trial court entered its final judgment. [R. 60-71].
D. Relevant Facts
The parties met while working at Wal-Mart, Inc. in New Mexico. [R. 82 at 26].
Jason Cecil (hereinafter "Jason") was an assistant manager and Stephanie Cecil
(hereinafter "Stephanie") was an assistant manager-in-training. [R. 82 at 26-27]. Jason
was offered a managerial position in Oregon and Stephanie discovered she was pregnant.
[R. 82 at 26-27]. The parties were married in Stephanie's hometown in San Juan County
on February 21, 1998 and then relocated to Oregon. [R. 82 at 26-27]. While in Oregon,
Jason made his highest wage. [R. 82 at 21]. The parties relocated twice for work and
each time, they had to borrow money from Jason's parents for the move. [R. 82 at 78,
72].
Jason's managerial position in Oregon did not work out. [R. 82 at 55]. He suffered a
great deal of stress with this position, to the point where Jason and Stephanie cried
together over his difficulties. [R. 82 at 74]. They decided to move to Illinois and be near
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Jason's family. [R. 82 at 30-31, 55]. The relocation resulted in a significant reduction of
pay. [R. 82 at 55, 87].
After returning to Illinois, their martial problems increased. [R. 82 at 75]. Matters
became difficult for Stephanie because they did not have their own home and she had
begun working, so they never saw each other. [R. 82 at 75]. When it became apparent
that they were unable to work out their problems, Jason suggested that they divorce. [R.
82 at 32]. At that point, Stephanie told Jason that she thought she was pregnant with their
third (3) child. [R. 82 at 32]. On December 17, 2001, Stephanie moved back to San Juan
County with the children. [R. 82 at 32].
Jason filed for divorce in Illinois and Stephanie received the papers in March 2002.
[R. 82 at p. 35]. Jason became involved with another woman in January 2002. [R. 82 at
p. 97]. In February or March 2002, she got pregnant. [R. 82 at 98]. Her pregnancy was
high risk. [R. 82 at 172]. Their child was born five and one-half (5 Vi) weeks premature.
[R. 82 at 98].
Due to the stress, Jason began taking medication for gastritis and generalized anxiety
disorder. [R. 82 at 85-86, 101, 145-46]. In December 2002, Jason made the decision to
step down from his assistant manager position to take a position as a night stocker. [R. 82
at 150, 176]. Around this same time, he was in a automobile accident. [R. 82 at 171].
Stephanie testified that Jason had never before faked an illness and would go to work
when he was 'sick as a dog.' [R. 82 at 88].

4

Jason's pay was reduced from forty-one thousand five hundred dollars ($41,500.00)
salary per year to thirty to thirty-five-thousand dollars ($30,000.00™ $35.000.00) per year.
[R. 82 a l l 76],

•;;.-'

.

•-• . - V •

•' ••

As I MI |MI ijn1 I in Jjsnii nuiiin'slcl liiiil llit1 In.il ., ui.il Irvmli Irnni thr sliitiih .',
guidelines as set forth in Utah Code § 30-3-32 and allow longer periods of time in the
summer and alternating holidays due to. the distance between the parties, [R. 82 at 2 0 1 206]. . Stephanie had allowed six (6) weeks for parent-time in the summer of 2002 [R
82 til hS |

Mir InuM'Mi I H I I M M (I I ,illuv» mn ili'vintion IIMIII llu slalutois guideline in

the summer of 2003 because Jason was behind in child support payments. [R. 82 at 68].
A s for Jason's financial ability to visit, Stephanie acknowledged that Jason's parents
picked u p and returned the children because Jason could not affoi d it [R. 82 at 84-85].
S!

i

'"

on coi lid int. :)t take time

from Thanksgiving to Christmas. [R. 82 at 31].
While the trial court acknowledged that outside of long vacations, it would be
virtually impossible for Jason to see the children, it nevertheless ordered that the two (2)
oldest children \ isit p ei the statutoi > guidelines [R 82 at 2 ] 7 218]

- . '

With respect to the youngest child, the trial court simply ruled that Stephanie was
trusted to foster a relationship between Jason and the youngest child, [R. 82 at 218],
All )] ig 1 lii )se lines, 1 1 ic • G >ui I < )i: cic >i c d tl lat Stephanie make the youngest child available •
before the two f

fder children were piciiM IIoi p;nrnl linn .nicl -iffn lhr\ iTluitinf limn

their visits. [R. 82 at 218].
The trial court ordered that since Jason was " the one that wants time with the
children" and was more responsible for the twelve hundred (1,200) mile difference
between the parties, he was ordered to pay all expenses associated with parent-time. [R.
82 at 218].
As to child support, Stephanie asked that Jason pay at the rate he was earning in
Oregon. [R. 82 at 215]. Jason asked that he pay according to his actual pay. [R. 82 at
215]. The trial court found that Jason was incapable of working as a manager of WalMart, Inc. because he was unable to sustain that position without difficulty. [R. 82 at
216]. The trial court also acknowledged that both parties agreed to step down with
respect to his income. [R. 82 at 216]. The trial court, however, was not persuaded that
the best that Jason could do was to be a stocker nor was the court persuaded that Jason
was mentally or physically incapable of working. [R. 82 at 216]. The court found no
evidence that he would be unsuccessful working as an assistant-manager of Wal-Mart,
Inc. [R. 82 at 216]. The trial court found that Jason's choice to be employed as a stocker
a voluntary decision, that his family should not suffer as a result of this decision and
imputed his income at the rate he earned as an assistant manager, to wit, forty-one
thousand five hundred dollars ($41,500.00) a year. [R. 82 at 216].
Jason took issue with the fact that Stephanie returned to school. [R. 82 at 198, 210].
He pointed out that she had basic job skills, including being an assistant manger-in-
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training at Wal-Mart, Inc. [R. 82 at 210]. Acknowledging that she had basic job skills,
Stephanie stated that it had always been her dream to go to nursing school. [R. 82 at
184]. Moreover, Stephanie testified that she did not go to work in another place other

68].
The trial court set Stephanie's income based upon the aid that she was receiving as a
student at nine hundred dollars ($900.00) per month until 2005. r ^ $2 at 221].
I he total child si i|: poi I: w as calculated at ele\ en hundred ,.*.;;. •-1ie dollars (S>.
per month. [R. 82 at 221]. Stephanie's portion was srt ;i( Iw.

•)

thi

($231.00) per month and Jason's portion was set at nine hundred dollars ($900.00) per
month. [R. 82 at 221].
1'*

••;

••-. - .;•

at 226]. Stephanie was av : • l -

liiuu '• • ::us ... . .. Jispai/i\ in income '

^2

l

a period of thirty-six (36) months. [R. 82 at 226]. Stephanie was also awarded one-half
of the interest in the profit-sharing plan, acquired during marriage, or seven thousand five
I "liilircil ilollit's ($ ' ">iMi mi i |R '-: ' JII " >n| ll.n- 111 ui v\;is o n l ' i a l In hear the cost of •
preparing the qualified. domestic relations order in addition to pa> ing Stephanie" s
attorney's fees in the amount of two thousand dollars ($2,000.00). [R. 82 at 230].
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I lit1 IIKII nintfl IIIHI1 "ill nil discretion when mli l.ulnl l< I.islii HI ,I |MIcnl-tioie plan that
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took into account the best interests of the children. It, likewise, failed to take into account
the difficulty that the noncustodial parent would have visiting his children, his inability to
visit his youngest child, his lack of financial resources and his work schedule. Imposing
the statutory guidelines resulted in the two (2) oldest children having limited contact
during the summer and almost no parent-time during the holidays. Finally, it afforded
Jason no realistic hope of fostering a relationship with his youngest child, since parenttime was to take place before and after the visits with the oldest children and it was
Jason's parents who would be picking up and returning the children.
The trial court, abused its discretion when it imputed Jason's income. It failed to take
into consideration his circumstances when it concluded that Jason was voluntarily
underemployed.
Third, the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded Stephanie alimony.
Stephanie had basic job skills and her decision to pursue a nursing degree did not justify
the reduction in her pay nor the requirement that Jason pay alimony due to the disparity in
their income..
Finally, given the fact that Stephanie was awarded seven thousand five hundred
dollars ($7,500.00) from the pension plan, she failed to show that she did not have the
ability to pay her attorneys' fees. Additionally, for reasons set forth regarding the error in
imputing Jason's income, he did not have the ability to pay her attorneys' fees.

8

ARG [ ] MEN I1
Point 1:

J;

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
IMPOSED THE STATUTORY GUIDELINES AND HELD JASON
RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH PARENTTIME.
•

•

^lephanie lives in ( Jtah, a distanc e of approximately one

thousand two hundred miles (1. 200) [R 82 at 30 32] Based on this significant distance
between the parties, Jason requested a deviation from the statutory guidelines. [R. 82 at
201-206]. Jason also noted that Stephanie had allowed such deviation the previous
summer, hi! insisted \m the slatuli •> • guidelines because Jason was behind on child
s

:. something that shoi ilci no

:

1 N • i 1 11 I»i U • i n 11111»i1 n s i< I r r ; 111 o n [ R S 1 ,11 < ! 11

The trial court declined to deviate from the statutory schedule and allow longer
summer and alternating holidays. [R. 82 at 217-218] Noting that Jason was responsible
foi the distance bet\ v een them and noting that It w as J ason who w anted to see the

That decision essentially punished Jason and it is inconsistent with the statutes
governing parent-time.
Utah Code § 30 3 34 p i c • »- ides as folio \ vs:

:

'

{ 1 ) If the parties are unable to agree on a parent-time
schedule, the court may establish a parent-time schedule
consistent with the best interests of the child.
(2) The advisory guidelines as provided in Section 30-3-33
and the parent-time schedule as provided in Sections 30-3-35
and 30-3-35.5 shall be presumed to be in the best Interests of
9

the child. The parent-time schedule shall be considered the
minimum parent-time to which the noncustodial parent and
the child shall be entitled unless a parent can establish
otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence that more or
less parent-time should be awarded based upon any of the
following criteria:
(b) the distance between the residency of the child and the
noncustodial parent.

(Emphasis added.)
Not only does the statute require that the distance be taken into account, but it requires
that the parent-time schedule be in the child's best interest and allow both parents an
active role in parenting.
(2)(a) it is in the best interests of the child of divorcing,
divorced, or adjudicated parents to have frequent, meaningful,
and continuing access to each parent following separation or divorce;
(b) each divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parent is
entitled to and responsible for frequent, meaningful, and
continuing access with his child consistent with the child's
best interests; and
(c) it is in the best interests of the child to have both parents
actively involved in parenting the child.
Utah Code § 30-3-32. Here, the trial court was well aware of the difficulty that Jason had
with exercising parent-time. In fact, the trial court noted that "outside of long vacations, it
would be virtually impossible" for Jason to see the children. [R. 82 at 217-218]. Yet,
instead of considering means that would allow Jason access to the children, the trial court
imposed the statutory guidelines. Such a schedule failed to allow frequent, meaningful
10

and continuing access between Jason and the children. It, likewise, disregarded the
children's best interests to have frequent, meaningful and continuing access to both
parents as well as have both parents actively involved in parenting.
This is especially true with respect to the relationship between Zack and his father.
The trial court stated that Jason would be able to see Zack only when the older two (2)
children were picked up and returned even though Stephanie testified that Jason's
parent's picked up and returned the children because of Jason's lack of financial
resources. [R. 82 at 218, 31]. She also testified that Jason, as a Wal-Mart, Inc. employee,
would be unable to take time off between Thanksgiving and Christmas. [R. 82 at 31].
By ignoring Jason's work schedule and the expense that he would have to bear to
exercise parent time, the trial court's ruling also ran afoul of the advisory guidelines:
In addition to the parent-time schedules provided in Sections
30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5, advisory guidelines are suggested to
govern all parent-time arrangements between parents. These
advisory guidelines include:
(6) the court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule
to reasonably accommodate the work schedule of both parents
and may increase the parent-time allowed to the noncustodial
parent but shall not diminish the standardized parent-time
provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5;
(7) the court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule
to reasonably accommodate the distance between the parties
and the expense of exercising parent-time:
Utah Code § 30-3-33 (emphasis added).
Here, the court required Jason to bear all the expense. It refused to reasonably
11

allocate the expense of exercising parent-time.
In sum, the trial court's decision to impose the statutory guidelines and require Jason,
the noncustodial parent, to bear all expenses because he is the one that is at most fault for
the distance between the parties and because uhe is the one that wants time with the
children" not only runs afoul of the statutes set forth above, but is clearly against public
policy. [R. 82 at 218]. Parent-time cannot be used in a manner to either deny access to a
parent or to punish a parent. The parent that wants to see his or her children should not be
the one that has to bear all the financial costs of parent-time. Yet, this is precisely what
the trial court ordered.
Point 2:

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
FOUND JASON TO BE VOLUNTARILY UNDEREMPLOYED AND
IMPUTED HIS INCOME

It is well established that a trial court has the authority to impute income if it finds that
a parent is voluntarily underemployed.2

2

See also. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1024

Utah Code 78-45-7.5 provides in, relevant part, that:
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine
whether an underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the
parent stipulates to the amount imputed, the party defaults, or,
in contested cases, a hearing is held and a finding made that
the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based
upon employment potential and probable earnings as derived
from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing
12

(Utah Ct. App. 1993). In doing so, the trial court must look at the circumstances of a
parent in order to determine whether that parent is voluntarily underemployed to avoid a
child support obligation.
Here, the trial court looked at Jason's historical income. [R. 82 at 216]. As to Jason's
explanation as to why he quit as an assistant manager, the trial court simply stated that it
was not convinced that Jason's mental and physical condition prevented him from
working in the position as an assistant manager. [R. 82 at 216]. The trial court concluded
that Jason was voluntarily underemployed and imputed his income based on his historical
earnings as an assistant manager or forty-one thousand five hundred dollars ($41,500.00)
per year. [R. 82 at 216]. In doing so, the trial court abused its discretion.
In Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), the appellate court addressed this
very issue. There, the father quit his job which paid twenty-four hundred dollars
($2,400.00) per month, returned to school and got a job paying six dollars and ninety
cents ($6.90) per hour. As a result of his decision, his family had to go on welfare. Id.,
869 P.2d at 965. At trial, Mr. Hill conceded that income imputation was appropriate,
however, disagreed on the amount. Id.
The circumstances of the instant case stands in sharp contrast to the circumstances in
earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the
community, or the median earning for persons in the same
occupation in the same geographical area as found in the
statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

13

Hill Unlike Mr. Hill, Jason did not simply decide to return to school and take a lower
paying job. Nor did he concede that imputation was appropriate.
In March of 1998, Jason married Stephanie, who was pregnant and relocated to
Oregon. [R. 82 at 26-27]. While in Oregon, the family moved twice. [R. 82 at 78].
Although Jason was at his highest wage while in Oregon, he still had to borrow money
from his parents to help with the moves. [R. 82 at 72].
Almost immediately, Jason experienced a great deal of stress in his new position as a
co-manager. [R. 82 at 55]. Stephanie acknowledged this when she testified that Jason and
she cried together. [R. 82 at 74]. Three years later, they decided to move to Illinois to be
close to his family (August 2001). [R. 82 at 30-31, 55]. As a result of this decision, they
took a significant reduction in pay. [R. 82 at 55, 87].
When they arrived in Illinois, the family moved in with Jason's parents. [R. 82 at 75].
Both worked in effort to be able to move into their own home. [R. 82 at 75]. As a result
of working in different areas, Jason and Stephanie hardly saw each other. [R. 82 at 75].
Their marital problems increased. [R. 82 at 75]. At one point, Jason suggested that they
divorce, only to find out that Stephanie was pregnant. [R. 82 at 32]. Eventually,
Stephanie moved from Illinois with the children. [R. 82 at 32].
After their breakup, Jason filed for divorce in Illinois. [R. 82 at 35]. He also became
involved with another woman. [R. 82 at 97]., She became pregnant and due to
difficulties, almost lost their child. [R. 82 at 172]. Their daughter was born five and one-
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half weeks (5 Vi) premature. [R. 82 at 98]. Jason then was in a car accident. [R. 82 at
171].
Looking at the stressors over a this period, it is certainly apparent that Jason was not
doing well. As a result, Jason began taking medication for gastritis and generalized
anxiety. [R. 82 at 85-86, 101, 145-146]. He also made the decision not to continue
working as an assistant manager and became a night stocker. [R. 82 at 150, 176].
There is no question but that parents have an obligation to support their children to the
best of their abilities. Jason has done that. He never quit working, rather he made the
choice to work in a less demanding and stressful position.
Given Jason's circumstances, the trial court erred when it disregarded his present
ability to generate income. Jason's emotional and physical condition underscores that he
is not simply disregarding his familial obligations. Indeed, Stephanie testified that he
would often work when he was as 'sick as a dog' and he was not a malinger. [R. 82 at
88]. There was no testimony that his decision to step down was due to malingering. In
fact, there is no indication that Jason acted in bad faith with respect to taking a lower
paying position. His explanation and justification for this reduction was reasonable.
Point 3:

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
AWARDED STEPHANIE ALIMONY,

When awarding alimony, the trial court must consider the "financial condition and
needs of the recipient spouse." Utah Code §30-3-5(8)(a)(l).
In the case at hand, the trial court looked at Stephanie's needs without questioning her
15

financial condition and needs3. Jason took issue with the alimony on that basis4.
As to her financial condition, Stephanie's income was low because of her decision to
go to nursing school. She stated that it had been her dream to go to nursing school. [R.
82 at 184]. However, Stephanie had basic job skills and had worked at Wal-Mart, Inc.
as an assistant manager-in-training. [R. 82 at 210].
In Mancil v. Smith 18 P3d 509 (Utah Ct. App. 2000), the appellate court rejected a
parent's decision to return to school where it was schooling beyond basic job skills. In so
holding, the court reasoned:
Our conclusion is fully consistent with the policy underlying
Utah's child support laws, which are designed to maximize
support to children from both parents. See Utah Code Ann. §
78-45-3(1) (Supp. 2000) ("Every father shall support his
child[.]"); id. § 78-45-4(1) ("Every woman shall support her
child[.]lf). "Utah's clear policy is to require both parents to
support their child to the extent that each is financially able."
Department of Human Servs. ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 945
P.2d 676, 683 (Utah 1997) (Zimmerman, C.J., dissenting). To
allow a parent to disregard this duty over the course of a fouryear college education would run counter to this policy. A
child's right to ongoing support should not be held hostage to
a parent's desire to get a higher education, even if the parent's
degree will eventually allow the parent to pay support at a
higher level. n2
3

The trial court also noted the disparity in the parties' income. Utah Code § 30-35(8)( "The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties'
respective standards of living.").
4

For the reasons set forth in the section addressing the imputed income, Jason also

objected on the basis that he larked the, ability to pay alimnnjf
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Footnotes
n2 For better or worse, one's income level and resulting ability
to pay child support are not necessarily enhanced by a college
education. A good car salesman with a high school diploma
may well earn more than an elementary school teacher with a
bachelor's degree.
Mancil, 18 P.3d at §16, fn. 2.
Here, Stephanie decision to go to nursing school, when she already possessed basic
job skills was unreasonable under Mancil.
Thus, the trial court erred by failing to consider Stephanie's earning capacity. Rehn v.
Rehn, §9, 974 P2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). The court, however, merely referenced her
monthly income and did not take into account earning capacity. Rehn at §9 (citing
Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)).
The trial court also erred when it failed to enter any findings as to the reasonableness
of her needs. Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P2d 877, 880 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)(Findings
required. Moreover, "failure to consider these factors constitutes an abuse of discretion"
[Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958-59 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)] resulting in reversal
"unless pertinent facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting
only a finding in favor of the judgment. Rehn 974 P.2d at 310 quoting Stevens.
Here, the only pertinent facts regarding Stephanie's need for alimony was her reduced
income due to her decision to return to school. No findings were entered with respect to
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the actual need. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion.
Point 4:

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
AWARDED ATTORNEYS' FEES TO STEPHANIE.

The law governing alimony is Utah Code § 30-3-5(8) which provides, in relevant part,
that:
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors
in determining alimony:
(I) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;

Here, the trial court simply accepted Stephanie's financial condition and needs
without questioning her earning capacity or ability to produce income. It, likewise,
disregarded the fact that Stephanie would receive seven thousand five hundred dollars
($7,500.00) as her part of the interest that accrued in the parties' pension plan during
marriage. [R. 82 at 220].
Even without imputing her income, Stephanie had the ability to pay her own
attorneys' fees from the award of seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500.00) from
the pension plan.
For reasons set forth above in Point 2 (which address the imputation of Jason's
income), the trial court erred in finding that Jason had the ability to pay Stephanie's
attorneys' fees.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the trial court's decision regarding
parent-time, child support, the award of alimony and attorneys' fees.
DATED this

day of>fcry 2004.
y submitted:

RQ$ALIE REILLY
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct-copies of the foregoing to Craig
C. Halls, Attorney for Appellee, 333 South Main, landing, UT 84532, postage prepaid,
this J # : day oOrfay 2004.
R0SALIE REILLY
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Utah Code § 30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of
parties and children — Division of debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction —
Custody and parent-time — Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for
modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include
the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical
and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for
the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5
(1) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts,
obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the
court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate,
current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11,
Recovery Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning
financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If
the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent
children would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial
parent to provide child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for
the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for
distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the
mother and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification.
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of pairents and visitation rights of grandparents
and other members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of
the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the
court may include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a
provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered
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parent-time or visitation schedule entered under this chapter.
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court
order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable
attorneys1 fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that
the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith.
(7) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or
a visitation order by a grandparent or other member of the immediate family pursuant to
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted by
the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees
and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to
provide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time.
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(I) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor
spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor
spouse to attend school during the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time
of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the
court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion,
base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of
short duration, when no children have been conceived or bom during the marriage, the
court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties'
respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the
income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be
considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If
one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing
the marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children
have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each
party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage.
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(g) (I) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders
regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not
foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs
of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not
be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the
payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that
a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or
death of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void
ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to
the action of annulment and his rights are determined.
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon
establishment by the party paying alimony thatt the former spouse is cohabitating with
another person.
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Utah Code § 30-3-32. Parent-time - Intent - Policy - Definitions
(1) It is the intent of the Legislature to promote parent-time at a level consistent with all
parties' interests.
(2) Absent a showing by a preponderance of evidence of real harm or substantiated
potential harm to the child:
(a) it is in the best interests of the child of divorcing, divorced, or adjudicated parents to
have frequent, meaningful, and continuing access to each parent following separation or divorce;
(b) each divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parent is entitled to and responsible for
frequent, meaningful, and continuing access with his child consistent with the child's best
interests; and
(c) it is in the best interests of the child to have both parents actively involved in
parenting the child.
(3) For purposes of Sections 30-3-32 through 30-3-37:
(a) "Child" means the child or children of divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parents.
(b) "Christmas school vacation" means the time period beginning on the evening the child
gets out of school for the Christmas or winter school break until the evening before the
child returns to school, except for Christmas Eve and Christmas Day.
(c) "Extended parent-time" means a period of parent-time other than a weekend, holiday
as provided in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) and (2)(g), religious holidays as provided in
Subsections 30-3-33(3) and (15), and "Christmas school vacation."
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Utah Code § 30-3-33. Advisory guidelines
In addition to the parent-time schedules provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5,
advisory guidelines are suggested to govern all parent-time arrangements between
parents. These advisory guidelines include:
(1) parent-time schedules mutually agreed upon by both parents are preferable to a courtimposed solution;
(2) the parent-time schedule shall be utilized to maximize the continuity and stability of
the child's life;
(3) special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the child available to
attend family functions including funerals, weddings, family reunions, religious holidays,
important ceremonies, and other significant events in the life of the child or in the life of
either parent which may inadvertently conflict with the parent-time schedule;
(4) the noncustodial parent shall pick up the child at the times specified and return the
child at the times specified, and the child's regular school hours shall not be interrupted;
(5) the custodial parent shall have the child ready for parent-time at the time he is to be
picked up and shall be present at the custodial home or shall make reasonable alternate
arrangements to receive the child at the time he is returned;
(6) the court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably
accommodate the work schedule of both parents and may increase the parent-time
allowed to the noncustodial parent but shall not diminish the standardized parent-time
provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5;
(7) the court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably
accommodate the distance between the parties and the expense of exercising parent-time;
(8) neither parent-time nor child support is to be withheld due to either parent's failure to
comply with a court-ordered parent-time schedule;
(9) the custodial parent shall notify the noncustodial parent within 24 hours of receiving
notice of all significant school, social, sports, and community functions in which the child
is participating or being honored, and the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to attend
and participate fully;
(10) the noncustodial parent shall have access directly to all school reports including
preschool and daycare reports and medical records and shall be notified immediately by
the custodial parent in the event of a medical emergency;
(11) each parent shall provide the other with his current address and telephone number
within 24 hours of any change;
(12) each parent shall permit and encourage liberal telephone contact during reasonable
hours and uncensored mail privileges with the child;
(13) parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than surrogate care and
the court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if
willing and able, to provide child care;
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(14) each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers with the name, current address,
and telephone number of the other parent and shall provide the noncustodial parent with
the name, current address, and telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the
court for good cause orders otherwise; and
(15) each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious holidays
celebrated by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious holiday that the other
parent does not celebrate shall have the right to be together with the child on the religious holiday.
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Utah Code § 30-3-34. Best interests - Rebuttable presumption
(1) If the parties are unable to agree on a parent-time schedule, the court may establish a
parent-time schedule consistent with the best interests of the child.
(2) The advisory guidelines as provided in Section 30-3-33 and the parent-time schedule
as provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5 shall be presumed to be in the best
interests of the child. The parent-time schedule shall be considered the minimum parenttime to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall be entitled unless a parent can
establish otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence that more or less parent-time
should be awarded based upon any of the following criteria:
(a) parent-time would endanger the child's physical health or significantly impair the
child's emotional development;
(b) the distance between the residency of the child and the noncustodial parent;
(c) a substantiated or unfounded allegation of child abuse has been made;
(d) the lack of demonstrated parenting skills without safeguards to ensure the child's wellbeing during parent-time;
(e) the financial inability of the noncustodial parent to provide adequate food and shelter
for the child during periods of parent-time;
(f) the preference of the child if the court determines the child to be of sufficient maturity;
(g) the incarceration of the noncustodial parent in a county jail, secure youth corrections
facility, or an adult corrections facility;
(h) shared interests between the child and the noncustodial parent;
(I) the involvement of the noncustodial parent in the school, community, religious, or
other related activities of the child;
(j) the availability of the noncustodial parent to care for the child when the custodial
parent is unavailable to do so because of work or other circumstances;
(k) a substantial and chronic pattern of missing, canceling, or denying regularly scheduled
parent-time;
(1) the minimal duration of and lack of significant bonding in the parents' relationship
prior to the conception of the child;
(m) the parent-time schedule of siblings;
(n) the lack of reasonable alternatives to the needs of a nursing child; and
(o) any other criteria the court determines relevant to the best interests of the child.
(3) The court shall enter the reasons underlying its order for parent-time that:
(a) incorporates a parent-time schedule provided in Section 30-3-35 or 30-3-35.5; or
(b) provides more or less parent-time than a parent-time schedule provided in Section 303-35 or 30-3-35.5.
(4) Once the parent-time schedule has been established, the parties may not alter the
schedule except by mutual consent of the parties or a court order.
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Utah Code § 30-3-35. Minimum schedule for parent-time for children 5 to 18 years
of age
(1) The parent-time schedule in this section applies to children 5 to 18 years of age.
(2) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule, the following schedule shall be
considered the minimum parent-time to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall
be entitled:
(a) (I) one weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent or the court from
5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m.; or
(ii) at the election of the noncustodial parent, one weekday from the time the child!s
school is regularly dismissed until 8:30 p.m., unless the court directs the application of
Subsection (2)(a)(I);
(b) (I) alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree
from 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year; or
(ii) at the election of the noncustodial parent, from the time the child's school is regularly
dismissed on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday, unless the court directs the application of
Subsection (2)(b)(I);
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend parent-time, and changes shall not be
made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend parent-time schedule;
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncustodial parent shall be
responsible for the child's attendance at school for that school day;
(e) (I) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the total holiday
period extends beyond that time so that the child is free from school and the parent is free
from work, the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to this lengthier holiday period; or
(ii) at the election of the noncustodial parent, parent-time over a scheduled holiday
weekend may begin from the time the child's school is regularly dismissed at the
beginning of the holiday weekend until 7 p.m. on the last day of the holiday weekend;
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays:
(I) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until
9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for
the birthday;
(ii) Martin Luther King, Jr. beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the
holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is
completely entitled;
(iii) spring break or Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on the day school lets out for the
holiday until 7 p.m. on the Sunday before school resumes;
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday
extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday;
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the
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holiday; and
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-332(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday
is equally divided;
(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays:
(I) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of
the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday;
(ii) Washington and Lincoln Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Monday
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent
is completely entitled;
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday;
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday
extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(v) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A. weekend beginning at
6 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier
period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7 p.m; and
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation, including New Year's Day, as
defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 p.m.,
so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided;
(h) the custodial parent is entitled to the odd year holidays in even years and the even year
holidays in odd years;
(I) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive father every year beginning at
9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(j) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother every year beginning
at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(k) extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent may be:
(I) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial parent;
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; and
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial parent
consistent with these guidelines;
(1) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of uninterrupted time
during the children's summer vacation from school for purposes of vacation;
(m) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's extended
parent-time shall be 14 of the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the
custodial parent has holiday and phone visits;
(n) notification of extended parent-time or vacation weeks with the child shall be
provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent; and
(o) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration.
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(3) Any elections required to be made in accordance with this section by either parent
concerning parent-time shall be made a part of the decree and made a part of the parenttime order.
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Utah Code § 30-3-37. Relocation
(1) When either parent decides to move from the state of Utah or 150 miles or more from
the residence specified in the couifs decree, that parent shall provide if possible 60 days
advance written notice of the intended relocation to the other parent. The written notice of
relocation shall contain statements affirming the following:
(a) the parent-time provisions in Subsection (5) or a schedule approved by both parties
will be followed; and
(b) neither parent will interfere with the other's parental rights pursuant to court ordered
parent-time arrangements, or the schedule approved by both parties.
(2) The court may, upon motion of any party or upon the court's own motion, schedule a
hearing with notice to review the notice of relocation and parent-time schedule as
provided in Section 30-3-35 and make appropriate orders regarding the parent-time and
costs for parent-time transportation.
(3) In determining the parent-time schedule and allocating the transportation costs, the
court shall consider:
(a) the reason for the parent's relocation;
(b) the additional costs or difficulty to both parents in exercising parent-time;
(c) the economic resources of both parents; and
(d) other factors the court considers necessary and relevant.
(4) Upon the motion of any party, the court maiy order the parent intending to move to pay
the costs of transportation for:
(a) at least one visit per year with the other parent; and
(b) any number of additional visits as determined equitable by the court.
(5) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, upon the relocation of one of the parties the
following schedule shall be the minimum requirements for parent-time with a school-age child:
(a) in years ending in an odd number, the child shall spend the following holidays with
the noncustodial parent:
(I) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday until Sunday; and
(ii) the fall school break, if applicable, beginning the last day of school before the holiday
until the day before school resumes;
(b) in years ending in an even number, the child shall spend the following holidays with
the noncustodial parent:
(I) the entire winter school break period; and
(ii) Spring break beginning the last day of school before the holiday until the day before
school resumes; and
(c) extended parent-time equal to Vi of the summer or off-track time for consecutive
weeks. The week before school begins may not be counted as part of the summer period.
(6) Upon the motion of any party, the court maiy order uninterrupted parent-time with the
noncustodial parent for a minimum of 30 days during extended parent-time, unless the
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court finds it is not in the best interests of the child. If the court orders uninterrupted
parent-time during a period not covered by this section, it shall specify in its order which
parent is responsible for the child's travel expenses.
(7) Unless otherwise ordered by the court the relocating party shall be responsible for all
the child's travel expenses relating to Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and lA of the child's travel
expenses relating to Subsection (5)(c), provided the noncustodial party is current on all
support obligations. If the noncustodial party has been found in contempt for not being
current on all support obligations, he shall be responsible for all of the child's travel
expenses under Subsection (5), unless the court rules otherwise. Reimbursement by either
responsible party to the other for the child's travel expenses shall be made within 30 days
of receipt of documents detailing those expenses.
(8) The court may apply this provision to any preexisting decree of divorce.
(9) Any action under this section may be set for an expedited hearing.
(10) A parent who fails to comply with the notice of relocation in Subsection (1) shall be
in contempt of the court's order.
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Utah Code § 78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed income
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including noneamed sources, except under
Subsection (3); and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from
anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimony from
previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, social security benefits, workers'
compensation benefits, unemployment compensation, income replacement disability
insurance benefits, and payments from "nonmeans-tested" government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one full-time 40hour job. However, if and only if during the time prior to the original support order, the
parent normally and consistently worked more than 40 hours at his job, the court may
consider this extra time as a pattern in calculating the parent's ability to provide child support.
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income aire:
(a) cash assistance provided under Title 3 5A, Chapter 3, Part 3, Family Employment Program;
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training Partnership Act,
Supplemental Security Income, Social Security Disability Insurance, Medicaid, Food
Stamps, or General Assistance; and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be calculated
by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation
from gross receipts. The income and expenses from self-employment or operation of a
business shall be reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross income available to
the parent to satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the amount of
business income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual basis and then
recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each parent shall provide
year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and complete copies of tax returns from at
least the most recent year unless the court finds the verification is not reasonably
available. Verification of incomefromrecords maintained by the Department of
Workforce Services may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income
tax returns.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an
underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection (7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount
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imputed, the party defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is held and a finding made
that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment
potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications,
and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community, or the
median earning for persons in the same occupation in the same geographical area as
found in the statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or their occupation is unknown, income shall be
imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an
administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis
for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist:
(I) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children approach or equal the
amount of income the custodial parent can earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he cannot earn minimum wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial parent's presence
in the home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a minor child who is the subject of a
child support award nor benefits to a minor child in the child's own right such as
Supplemental Security Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a parent shall be
credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by crediting
the amount against the potential obligation of that parent. Other unearned income of a
child may be considered as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case.
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also think that she ought to have those and he can buy them.
THE COURT:

Well I think the case law is I cannot

require her to sign any of those other, unless is he current.
MZ. REILLY:
MR. HALLS:
MZ. REILLY:

Current.
Well, and heTs yet to be current.
That's only on child support, Your

Honor.
MR. HALLS:
to be current.

Well, okay.

Call it whatever.

She didn't need to do that.

He's yet

She did it.

That's all I have, Your Honor.
COURT ORDER AND FINDINGS
THE COURT:

Okay.

In —

in setting, ah, child

support and determining, ah, the appropriateness of alimony, I
need to decide what his income is or would be, if he were
fully employed, if I think he's purposely intentionally
underemployed.
Ah, we have some significant extremes here for
someone that's avoided a regular job.

Ah, hefs advocating,

ah, $2,600 on the low end and she's advocating —

$2,600 a

month on the low end, and she's advocating, on the high end,
50 —

close to $5,500 a month.

Urn, the high end represents a

time when he was employed in an area of the United States
where there's a 15% premium for cost of living, ah, in Oregon,
and it was ^Isn rprpi v-ing a bonus.

And he was paid ac a

Manager for Wal-Mart store. Ah, but he never had employment
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as a Manager of a Wal-Mart store that was —
serious difficulty.
run he would —

I —

that was free of

I'm not persuaded that in the long

he would have been or can be, in the future,

successful as a Wal-Mart Manager.
by him by other people than me.

Now thatfs gonna be decided

But I have one instance where

he's a Wal-Mart Manager and he was in conflict with his —
with his boss, ah, and it was bad enough that the two of them
mutually agreed that it was good to look for another job, even
if it meant stepping down a step on the corporate ladder.
Ah, on the other hand, on the low end I'm not
persuaded that the best he can do, ah, is what he's doing now.
Ah, I've heard no evidence that he was ever unsuccessful as an
Assistant Manager.

I'm not persuaded that it was medically

physically necessary for his health that he not work as an
Assistant Manager, and he says the stress as an Assistant
Manager is less than as a Manager.

So I believe he could be

employed as an Assistant Manager and that not being thus
employed is a volunteer decision on his part, which his family
should not suffer for, ah, particularly those members of his
family who aren't getting any of the benefit from the reduced
stress.

So, urn, I'm going to set his, ah, salary at $41,500,

which is the best evidence I have of his income as an
Assistant Manager.
Nuw the next question was the value of the van, ah,
as opposed to the debt on the van.
O F F I C T A T . rirt)rpTT-.Tm

Ah, it's hard for me to

1

ignore what I —

what I know.

And I think this is common

2

knowledge, ah, about the car and the used car market and, ah,

3

I just cannot believe that a 2001 Dodge Caravan is worth

4

$24,000.

5

best evidence of the debt on it is that it's $24,000.

Ah, I believe that it's worth about $14,000.

And my
That

6

11 difference is $10,000 and that's the result of the choices the

7

two of them jointly made about what cars they would buy and

8

what cars they would use and when they'd sell 'em and when

9

they'd buy new ones.

It's unfortunate, but not uncommon for

10

people to get upside down on their vehicles.

11

to be $10,000 of marital debt.

12

So that's going

The parental debt, the debt to his parents is not

13

11 evidenced by any writing, nor by any evidence of an explicit

L4

agreement, ah, by both parties to the marriage to repay that

L5

amount.

L6

enforceable bona fide debt of the marriage and I'm going to

L7

|| ignore any obligation thereon, ah, as a marital obligation,

L8

|| except that if there is any responsibility there, ah, it will

.9
10

Ah, I'm not persuaded that it is therefore a legally

be paid by him.
||

Urn, there hasn't been much testimony about any

!1

alternative custody arrangement than —

!2

her, and that's clearly what's appropriate here.

'3

than sole custody for

As far as parent time is concerned, urn, the

4

circumstances are such that —

that —

that outside of long

5

vacations, it's going to be virtually impossible for him to

see the children in person, ah, so Ifm —

Ifm going to, ah,

set that at the minimum visitation schedule for children 5 to
18 for both of the older children, even -chough one of them is
not yet four.

I think the fact that the two of them can go

together is going to ameliorate the concerns I might have
about a four-year-old or a three-year-old.
Ah, any expenses that result from the great distance
between the two of them will be born by him.
that wants the time with the children.

Ah, he's the one

Ah, I think he is the

one of the two that is more responsible for the fact that
these children now have two parents who are separated by
1,200-1,300 miles of road.
Ah, with respect to Zack, ah, Ifm going to trust
mother to, ah, foster a relationship with the —
child and the father.

Urn, I —

between the

I am going to require that she

make Zack available to visit with his father before he, ah —
before the father picks up the other children and after the
father brings the other children back.
something that makes sense.

That sounds like

Ifm going to le^ve it to your

good judgment when Zack is familiar enough with his father
that he would be able to also make the trip with them for
these extended visits, ah, and may involve some familiarity
with the people who are going to transport him.

The time will

come when he wants to go, and that's about the time you- should
let him.
nFFTTTAT, PFRTTFTF.n TRANSCRIPT

1

don't know what I can do, except assume that it's, ah —

2

of course, assuming that it's zero is —

3

advantage.

Okay.

do you?

6

MZ. REILLY:

7

THE COURT:

8

No.
He'd come on the stand and his testimony

would be the only thing we'd have.
MZ. REILLY:

9
10

is, ah, to his

You don't have any documentation about that either,

4
5

That he brings home —

THE COURT:

12

MZ. REILLY:

Yeah.
But is the Court going to wait for,

13

ah —

14

this, if they were supposed to intervene.

16
17

that she brings

home $300 every two weeks.

11

15

for ORS to get involved?

MR. HALLS:

Because ORS could certainly do

Your Honor, she didn't actually go get

any kind of support until June, so it's only been, what?
THE COURT:

Okay.

Well I don't think I can reduce

18

it for children in his present home.

L9

evidence I need to do that.

>0

a month from her work and, ah, it's presumed that she's

>1

providing $231 of support to her children, leaving her

!2

$669 for her other needs.

3

well

I don't have the

So he's —

she's gonna have $900

Urn, I've got him at, ah, about $3,450 per month,

4

paying $900 of child support, leaving him with $2,550 for his

5

other needs.

Urn, it's still pretty stark contrast between the

two of them.

I'm going to require that he pay, ah —

you

know, the difficult thing about all of these calculations is
as soon as he's paying her, she's not gonna get her TANF.
TANF's going away.

She's not really getting —

count on her continuing to receive TANF.
MR. HALLS:

Her

I can't really

Ah —

It's why we did the two sheets.

We did

the second sheet that basically shows that when he starts
paying, she loses —

she gets about $161 in —

THE COURT: And if she doesn't loose it, they're
gonna collect it from him and she's not gonna see it anyway.
Well see, I'd —

I'd have him paying her another $900 in

alimony, if I was strictly equalizing their income, spreading
the misery out between the two of them because there's no way
that the two —

these two people can enjoy the same lifestyle

they enjoyed when they were together and, ah, he was a Manager
of a Wal-Mart in Oregon.
Well I'm gonna require that he pay, ah, alimony of,
ah, $500 a month till, ah —
MZ. REILLY:

for three years.

Until when, Your Honor?

THE COURT:

For three years.

MR. HALLS:

36 months.

THE COURT:

I'm going to require that he does pay

the arrearages on child support and alimony and —
MR. HALLS:
us that something —

$6,700, less fhp —

Hn they nood to ohow

what do we do about the —
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